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Introduction
Once upon a time the German jurist Carl Schmitt apostrophised
Thomas Hobbes as ‘by far the greatest and perhaps the sole truly
systematic political thinker’.1 Hobbes drew Schmitt’s admiration
on many counts, but perhaps above all for his formidable
assessment of the nature of political life itself and of its
consequences. For Hobbes, politics is ﬁrst of all the struggles
which naturally result from the collisions between human
purposes which are persistently partial and ultimately in
competitionwith one another.2 The partiality of human judgement
breeds controversy. Controversy, once stripped of its veneer of
sophistication, is pure enmity. Enmity is therefore the natural
condition of mankind. In this condition each man decides for
himself the threat posed to his life and purposes by every other
man and acts accordingly, with the result that all human lives and
purposes are drastically and radically imperilled. If a given group of
human beings is to survive at all, and to pursue any purposes
whatever, there must therefore be one supreme power which
establishes common rules which apply authoritatively to all the
members of that group and decides for all of them ‘what is to be
done, or not to be done’ in the ‘common course of life’.3 The
existence of such a power is not optional. It is the necessary
precondition of a civilized common life, which cannot sustain itself
otherwise.
Schmitt attributed to Hobbes the view that the same power
which established these rules decided also when andwhether they
applied in concrete situations. This decision was political in
Schmitt’s special sense of that term, because it was a decision
about who was friend and who was enemy – about who posed a
threat to the lives and purposes of every member of the group to
whom the rules normally applied and whether they could be dealt
withwithin the rules. As this supreme power alonewas authorised
to make that decision,4 it had a claim to the unconditional
obedience of all who were subject to it, for it took total
responsibility for protecting their lives in being responsible for
the decision, even as it revealed its essential characteristics in the
act of taking the decision. Thus, for Schmitt, the connection
between protection and obedience was the fundamental axiom of
political order, upon which everything else rested. In his words,
‘[t]he protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state. A theory
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1 Cited from the original version of The Concept of the Political (1927), in T. B.
Strong, ‘Carl Schmitt and Thomas Hobbes: Myth and Politics’, the foreword to C.
Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a
Political Symbol (Chicago, 2008), vii–xxviii, at x. For further expressions of admiration
and fraternity, compare C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus (Cologne, 1950), 61, 63, 67,
68, 75, 78, 89 and Glossarium: Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947–51, ed. E. F. vonMedem
(Berlin, 1991), 81.
2 On this point, see J. Dunn, The Cunning of Unreason (London, 2000), 19–30, 133–4.
3 T. Hobbes, De cive, ed. R. Tuck, trans. M. Silverthorne as On the citizen
(Cambridge, 1998), v.6, 72 (translation amended).
4 C. Schmitt, Political Theology (Chicago, 2005), 5.
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of the state that does not systematically manifest its awareness of
this proposition remains an inadequate fragment’. Hobbes had
been very well aware of this proposition, having ‘designated . . . as
the true purpose of his Leviathan, to instill in man once again ‘‘the
mutual relation between Protection and Obedience’’’, and his
greatness lay in systematically pursuing its implications in his
political theory.5
Hobbes [Schmitt continued] had experienced the truth of this
proposition ‘in the terrible times of civil war’, in which ‘all
legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive
themselves regarding political realities in periods of untroubled
security vanish.’ Experience had taught him that if ‘within the state
there are organised parties capable of according their members
more protection than the state, then the latter becomes at best an
annex of such parties, and the individual citizen knows whom he
has to obey’.6 That is to say, once the state became prey or party to
the antagonisms of individuals or groups within it, it could not
protect anyone or anything. In his own thinking, Schmitt
formalised these points in differentiating between a ‘qualitative
total state’, which was independent of society and retained the
monopoly on the political, which enabled it to distinguish friend
and enemy and so to carry out its function of protection, and a
‘quantitative total state’, which was indistinguishable from society
and unable to distinguish anything.7 The implications of this view
were made explicit in 1938, when Schmitt wrote that ‘[i]f
protection ceases, the state too ceases, and every obligation to
obey ceases.’8 The relation between protection and obedience, ‘the
cardinal point’9 of Hobbes’s conception of the state as it was of
Schmitt’s, is one theme of this essay.
Schmitt’s admiration for Hobbes was unfailing. But he came to
think that the ways in which Hobbes developed his position had
effectively condemned it to failure, from which disastrous
consequences were alleged to ﬂow. At the root of the problem, as
Schmitt saw it,wasHobbes’s ‘individualism’. This individualismwas
present in one way in Hobbes’s construction of the state as the
outcomeofa covenantbetween individual rational calculators10and
present in another way in his conception of the individual freedom
to differ in conscience from the public judgements of the supreme
power – and it ‘contained the seed of death that destroyed the
mighty Leviathan from within and brought about the end of the
mortal God’.11 It did so by undermining the totality of the state and
introducing thepossibilityof resisting thedemand forunconditional
obedience that it imposed.12 What Schmitt claimed was that
Hobbes’s position was self-liquidating: it created the conditions of
possibility for the disappearance of the state and assisted at the slide
which led through the conception of the state as amachinemade by
men to satisfy their wants to the anarchy which resulted from
different groups ofmen contending for control of themachine as the
means of furthering theirwants. By admitting into his arguments an
ineradicable individualistic component Hobbes was sawing off the
branch onwhich hewas sitting, since that individualism cut against
the adequacy of the state to the provision of protection.
In a recent essay, Ulrich Steinvorth is one more in a long line of
commentators to question the validity of Schmitt’s interpretation
of Hobbes.13 ‘Schmitt’, Steinvorth asserts, may have been ‘right in
considering [Hobbes to be] both authoritarian and liberal. He was
also right in ﬁnding inHobbes’s distinction between inner faith and
‘‘outer confession’’ a mark of his implicit liberalism’. But his own
prejudices ‘kept him from seeing that Hobbes’s liberalism . . . lies at
the very basis’ of his conception of the state, ‘and condemns it to an
uneasy imbalance. The same principle that is to give the one
sovereign person absolute powers gives every one irrevocable
human rights’.14 For Steinvorth, Hobbes’s position is inherently
unstable, pulled in two directions by an internal logic which
delivers absolute authority in one direction and individual
freedoms and rights in another. Schmitt is accused of valorizing
the authoritarian aspects of this position to the neglect of the
liberal ones, press-ganging Hobbes into his own project of claiming
for the state ‘an ultimate discretionary power in matters both
political . . . and religious’ and ignoring the rights and freedoms that
the state is brought into existence to protect.15 And if these are left
out of account, asks another recent commentator in the same vein,
‘what is left of Hobbes in Schmitt’s reading’?16 The purpose of this
essay is to provide an answer to that question.
The structure of the argument
The argument advanced in the essay comprises three claims.
The ﬁrst claim is that Steinvorth’s conclusions about Hobbes – and
his assumptions about Schmitt for that matter – are ﬁltered
through a picture of authority which presumes the tension
between authority and freedom that he purports to discover. So
his own prejudices bias his claims about Hobbes, perhaps in ways
that he may not fully appreciate. The second claim relates to
Hobbes’s individualism. On Schmitt’s account, it was this
individualism that opened the ‘barely visible crack in the
theoretical justiﬁcation of the sovereign state’ through which it
was worm-eaten by liberalism. This essay argues that Hobbes’s
individualism is not what Schmitt and his critics take it to be. The
individualism that ﬁgures in Hobbes’s discussions of covenant and
conscience, pace Schmitt,17 is an illusion, albeit one that lies at the
very basis of his conception of the state. This disposes to the third
claim, which is that Schmitt’s intuitions about Hobbes were well-
founded, since his position required many of the features of
Schmitt’s qualitative total state, and that that position presup-
posed a view of the protego ergo obligo that continued the pattern of
thinking that ran through his discussions of covenant and
5 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, 1996), 52.
6 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 52.
7 See C. Schmitt, ‘Die Wendung zum totalen Staat’ (1931), in: Positionen und
Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimer-Genf-Versailles, 1923–1939 (Berlin, 1988), 146–57. For
discussion, see R. Cristi, Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism (Cardiff, 1998). For
the inﬂuence of Schmitt’s formulations, see W. Bonefeld, ‘Democracy and
Dictatorship: Means and Ends of the State’, Critique, 34 (2006), 237–52.
8 Schmitt, State Theory, 72.
9 Schmitt, State Theory, 72.
10 C. Schmitt, ‘The State as Mechanism in Hobbes and Descartes’, in State Theory,
91–103, at 97.
11 Schmitt, State Theory, 57.
12 See on this point M. Vatter, ‘Strauss and Schmitt as Readers of Hobbes and
Spinoza: On the relation between Political Theology and Liberalism’,New Centennial
Review, 4 (2004), 161–214, at 190.
13 See e.g. H. Rumpf, Carl Schmitt und Thomas Hobbes, Ideelle Beziehungen und
aktuelle Bedeutung, mit einer Abhandlung u¨ber: Die Fru¨hschriften Carl Schmitts (Berlin,
1972); M. Rhonheimer, ‘Autoritas non veritas facit legem: Carl Schmitt und die Idee
des Verfassungsstaates’, Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 86 (2000), 484–98;
D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Now the machine runs itself: Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and Kelsen’,
Cardozo Law Review, 16 (1994), 1–19; J. P. McCormick, ‘Fear, Technology and the
State: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss and the Revival of Hobbes in Weimar and National
Socialist Germany’, Political Theory, 22 (1994), 619–52; G.Weiler, FromAbsolutism to
Totalitarianism: Carl Schmitt on Thomas Hobbes (Durango, Colo., 1994). This line of
commentary continues to grow: see now H. Althaus, ‘‘Heiden’’, ‘‘Juden’’, ‘‘Christen’’:
Positionen und Kontroversen von Hobbes bis Carl Schmitt (Wu¨rzburg, 2007), 9–20,
481–501; M. Sirczuk, ‘La interpretacio´n schmittiana de Hobbes’, Foro Interno:
Anuario de Teorı´a Polı´tica, 7 (2007), 35–50; C. Altini, ‘‘‘Potentia’’ as ‘‘Potestas’’: An
Interpretation of Modern Politics between Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt’,
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 36 (2010), 231–52.
14 U. Steinvorth, ‘On Carl Schmitt’s interpretation of Leviathan’, in: Leviathan
between the wars: Hobbes’s impact on early twentieth-century political philosophy, ed.
L. Foisneau, J. C. Merle, T. Sorell (Frankfurt, 2005), 95–107, at 104–5.
15 Steinvorth, ‘On Carl Schmitt’, 95.
16 L. Jaume, ‘Hobbes and the Philosophical Sources of Liberalism’, in: The
Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, ed. P. Springborg (Cambridge, 2007),
199–216, at 212.
17 Schmitt, Leviathan, 56.
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conscience. The essay concludes with a few remarks about the
wider implications of the argument it advances.
This argument is advanced by someone who wishes neither to
praise Schmitt nor to bury him but to understand his position
about Hobbes.18 It may be that the claims made here about
Schmitt’s thought and its implications are already familiar, or else
that they adumbrate his thought unduly in the effort to get a
clearer view of Hobbes’s thought and its implications. But
whatever the attendant risks, this effort is worth making
nevertheless, not least because Hobbes is one of those thinkers
with whom we must engage when trying to understand the
political condition of theworld inwhichwe live and the confusions
of thought that distort our understanding of it.
It is to one of these confusions of thought that the essay turns
ﬁrst, in discussing the picture of authority which lies beneath the
surface of Steinvorth’s account of Hobbes and Schmitt.
Confusions: two rival versions of authority
On that picture, modern European thought having in its early
days settled for an understanding of political authority in terms of
some sort of divine commission came to understand it instead in
terms of the consent of its subjects.19 Amongst much else, this
understanding brought with it the view that the authority of
government was limited in crucial respects, because the terms on
which it was constituted introduced and guaranteed such limits.
On the ﬁrst understanding, authority ﬂows from the God-given
or God-like superiority of the ruler to the ruled. On the second
understanding, the ruler is not the superior of the ruled, but rather
their agent or servant and, as such, to be directed and, if need be,
censured by them. This second understanding is associated by
many commentators with liberalism. From the viewpoint of the
second understanding, the ﬁrst is a specious imposture. From the
viewpoint of the ﬁrst understanding, the second is a self-
deconstructing individualist nightmare. Each viewpoint discloses
an understanding of authority whose claims are total and so each
necessarily excludes the other. As a result, each ﬁnds the other
perfectly obnoxious.20 It seems that Steinvorth is assuming
something like this picture of authority, and that almost
everything he writes about Hobbes – and Schmitt – is written in
the shadow of it.
Turning to Hobbes’s thought it is easy enough to understand
how Steinvorth could have so readily diagnosed an inherent
instability within it. For Hobbes’s political thought has features
which make it possible to assimilate to either one of the two
understandings of authority by which this picture is structured.
But those same features make it difﬁcult to appropriate to either
one entirely. This will be apparent from a brief account of his
thought that emphasises those aspects of it that are not easily
absorbed by the one or the other as a whole.
In the ﬁrst version of his political theory, The Elements of Law,
Hobbes argued that the subjection of those under government was
‘no less absolute, than the subjection of servants’. The supreme
magistrate was authorised ‘to frame and govern their actions at his
pleasure’; while those subject to the magistrate’s authority could
claim no exemption from subjection and obedience in the name of
right or conscience. Hobbes discussed two ways in which this
subjection might come about – the ﬁrst was for individuals to
consent, one to another, to institute a sovereign power above them
(what he came to call sovereignty by institution), the second was
for individuals to consent, one after another, to obey a conqueror
who held their lives in his hands (what he came to call sovereignty
by acquisition) – but concluded that the route by which people
became subject made no difference to the nature or extent of their
subjection.21
These two routes to establishing authority presupposed free
activityon thepart of individuals. Yet the vocabularyHobbesused to
describe magistracy often implied that it answered to a set of
imperatives that made individual freedom irrelevant. He spoke of
sovereigns as ‘vice-gods, or [God’s] lieutenantshereonearth’, able to
command in His name on pain of death in all civil and religious
matters. In the second recension of his theory, theDe cive, he raised,
only to set to one side, the possibility that the authority of the
magistrate came ‘not from the People’ at all, but was ‘instituted by
God’ at the creation.22 If sovereignty was as old as creation, so too
was subjection, and if people had always lived in subjection, they
could never have been free, since, at least on the terms outlined in
Elements of Law, subjection and freedom were antithetical to one
another – the second began where the ﬁrst ended.23
Neither were matters appreciably clearer in Leviathan. There
Hobbes deﬁned authority as ‘the Right of doing any Action’, but
added that this was something individuals voluntarily gave to
another by an act of their own, as by instituting a sovereign whose
authority ‘ariseth’ from their compact with one another.24 Once
authorised, the sovereign could not be constrained by them, for its
actions were their actions, its judgements their judgements; and it
bore all their right and power in its person. But there was little sign
thatHobbes thought of peoplemaking sovereignty in thisway in any
literal sense. On the contrary, he stated explicitly that not only those
whohad refused their consentat institution, butalso thosewhowere
neither involved nor consulted, were obliged to submit or to suffer
the consequences. Though the refuseniksmightperhapsbe reckoned
to have consented tacitly, it is not clear that the latter category can:
‘For if he entered into the Congregation of them thatwere assembled
[to institute a sovereign], he sufﬁciently declared thereby his will
(and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part
should ordayne . . . And whether he be of the Congregation, or not;
and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to
their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before;
wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man
whatsoever’.25 So the weight of Hobbes’s argument seems to fall on
subjection rather than authorisation by consent.
On the other hand, Hobbes also insisted that consent was
required to generate an obligation of obedience. He maintained
that there was ‘no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not
from some Act of his own’, writing elsewhere that civil laws ‘are
made by every man that is subject to them, because every one of
them consenteth to the placing of the Legislative Power’ and that
‘no involuntary action can be counted a submission to the
Law’.26 This suggested that consent was not merely a
psychological prop by which people relieved the ‘hard condition’
of their subjection, but something constitutive of the very
18 For praise, see P. Gottfried, Carl Schmitt (London, 1990). For burial, see e.g. R.
Gross, Carl Schmitt and the Jews. The ‘Jewish Question’, the Holocaust and German Legal
Theory (Madison, 2007), W. Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought: Order and
Orientation (Cambridge, 2009), W. E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (New
York, 1999).
19 See M. Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought (Exeter, 2006), 461.
20 For the contours and composition of this picture, and its role in shaping
interpretations of early modern thought, see T. Stanton, ‘Authority and Freedom in
the interpretation of Locke’s political theory’, Political Theory, XX (X), 1–25. First
published on October 25, 2010 as doi:10.1177/0090591710386571.
21 T. Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. J. C. A. Gaskin (Oxford,
1994), xxiii.9, 132; xx.19, 118; xxiv.2, 137.
22 Hobbes, Elements of Law, xxvi.12, 162; Hobbes, De cive, x.3, 117.
23 See Hobbes, Elements of Law, xxiii.9, 133: ‘liberty is the state of him that is not
subject’.
24 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.xvi.81, II.xxxi.187.
25 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xviii.90.
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxi.111; T. Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty,
Necessity, and Chance (London, 1656), 133; T. Hobbes, Behemoth, ed. S. Holmes
(Chicago, 1990), 50.
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authority to which they were subject.27 But then, if this were the
case, it was hard to understand how that authority could have
the characteristics Hobbes attributed to it.
Hobbes, to recollect, had argued that the authority to which
people were subject was absolute and arbitrary, because it was the
bearer of all right and power, and that people had instituted that
authority by acts of their own. However, he argued at the same time
that therewere somethings towhichpeople couldnever consent and
some rights they could never alienate to another: no one could give
up the right to preserve himself and his own reputation for
example.28 By the same token, people retained a wide range of
rights and freedoms in matters on which the law was silent, such as
the rights to enter into relations of exchange, to frame and govern
their own bodies and actions in choosing a trade, bringing up their
childrenandsoon.29 In Leviathan, thoughnot in theearlier recensions
of his theory, Hobbes even contemplated the possibility that people
might formulate their religious beliefs andmodes of worship as their
own consciences and interpretations of Scripture directed them –
‘there ought to be no Power over the consciences of men, but of the
Word it selfe’.30 The implication now is that by their own artiﬁce
people acting in concert create a corporate body inwhich their rights
and freedoms will be protected and preserved to a degree that far
exceeds anything that they are able to accomplish by nature, acting
singly, and so that, when they judge that their rights are being
imperilled, they can legitimately exert them against their sovereign.
Considered in this light, Hobbes’s fate at the hands of his
interpreters becomes altogether more intelligible. Here was a
proponent of absolute and unlimited sovereigntywho claimed that
it was the consent of subjects that constituted the authority of the
sovereign. His position combined an authority whose commands
could not be challenged – the view associated with our ﬁrst
understanding of authority –with individual rights and freedom as
the means of establishing and conditioning that authority – the
view associated with the second. The combination is striking, not
least because, on our picture, it is bizarre if not downright perverse.
Many commentators from Hobbes’s day to our own have been
struck very forcibly by this combination of elements. To the extent
that our picture has been present in their minds, it is easy to
understand why they should have responded to it as they have,31
by resiling to the reassuring simplicity and solidity of whichever
understanding of authority has coloured their perception of it,
before, from the viewpoint of the one understanding or the other,
assaulting Hobbes as a deviant or attempting to mitigate his
deviations from their own favoured understanding of authority.
From either viewpoint the difﬁculty to which they are responding
appears to be the same, the difﬁculty being that Hobbes has
provided an account of the origins and powers of government in
which the account of origins is at odds with and undercuts the
account of powers, and vice versa.
Nowourpicture encourages us to see only twopossible responses
to this difﬁculty – to give it up by discarding Hobbes’s position as
internally self-contradictory or to give in to it: that is, to accept the
difﬁculty as a real one and to deny the validity of one or other of the
accounts that give rise to it. It matters less for our purposes that the
accumulated scholarly record shows these possibilities being
pursued in many different ways by many different persons of many
different ideological persuasions than that it shows preponderantly
these possibilities being pursued. That is to say, when taken as a
whole, what it reveals unmistakably is the sustained imaginative
pressure that this picture has exerted across time and space.
We ﬁnd, for instance, Hobbes’s early critic John Bramhall
complaining, from the viewpoint of the ﬁrst understanding of
authority, that Hobbes’s rival understanding had delivered up a
‘Rebells catechism’.32 In postulating an individual’s right to do
whatever he judged necessary for his self-preservation, Bramhall
argued, Hobbes had effectively disaggregated the sovereign’s claim
to authority into a series of individual claims for the authority of
particular decisions and injunctions. The authority of each claim
was thenmade dependent upon its being ratiﬁed on every occasion
by the individual’s judgement that the decision or injunction in
question was unthreatening to his preservation. In suggesting that
authority depended on consent, therefore, Hobbes had eviscerated
it. Schmitt, as it appears, was led to a similar conclusion by a similar
route.33
On the other side we ﬁnd commentators like Steinvorth
suggesting, from the viewpoint of the second understanding of
authority, thatHobbes’s theory really contained the germofmodern
liberalism, since it made the individual’s right and freedom the
ultimate ground of government,which in turnplaced limits onwhat
that government could legitimately do. This suggestion has been
taken up and developed in different ways by many historians of
political thought and political theorists,whohave found inHobbes’s
arguments the rudiments of a liberal theory, if not always the
inclination on the part of their author to combine them appropri-
ately.34 But as with those who have discerned an authoritarian
Hobbes, so with thosewho see in outline a liberal Hobbes, the point
is that the same simpliﬁed picture of authority is silently shaping
their responses. Both parties are reacting to those features in
Hobbes’s thinking which from their viewpoint stand out as
excrescences. From the ﬁrst viewpoint, freedom obtrudes from
andchallenges theauthority towhich it isproperly submissive; from
the second, authority loomsover the freedombywhich it is properly
limited.Weneed to free ourselves from this picture ifwe are even to
recognise the possibility of responding in another way to the
difﬁculty that Hobbes’s accounts present.
The purpose of the next section of the essay is to indicate one
such possibility and one way of pursuing it. Thus attention turns
from the ﬁrst claim made in this essay to the second claim and the
third claim.
Hobbes, equality and authority
The task Hobbes set himself was to reconcile people to the idea
that there was no alternative to sovereignty. He wished to show
27 Hobbes, Elements of Law xx.15, 115. For further discussion, see N. Malcolm,
Reason of State, Propaganda and the Thirty Years’ War: An Unknown Translation by
Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 2007), 120–1.
28 See Q. Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge, 2008), 166–8, esp.
167, citing Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxi.112.
29 Skinner, Republican Liberty, 168, citing Hobbes, Leviathan II.xxi.109.
30 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV.xlvii.385.
31 This is not to say that there is no way of understanding these responses besides
the way suggested here. See for example C. D. Tarlton, ‘Rehabilitating Hobbes:
Absolutism, Obligation, and the Myth of the ‘‘Taylor’’ Thesis’, History of Political
Thought, 19 (1998), 407–35 and more generally S. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan
(Cambridge, 1962), M. Goldie, ‘The Reception of Hobbes’, in: The Cambridge History
of Political Thought 1450–1700, ed. J. H. Burns, M. Goldie (Cambridge, 1991), 589–
615, J. Parkin, Taming the Leviathan (Cambridge, 2007).
32 J. Bramhall, Castigations of Mr. Hobbes his last animadversions, in the case
concerning liberty, and universal necessity. With an appendix concerning The catching
of Leviathan or, The great whale (London, 1658), 515. For Hobbes and Bramhall, see
Parkin, Taming, 37–50 and N. Jackson,Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and
Necessity (Cambridge, 2007).
33 Bramhall, catching of Leviathan, 513, 515, 519, 573; C. Schmitt, State Theory, 56.
34 A. E. Taylor, Hobbes (London, 1908), 91–2 and compare A. Seth, English
Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy (London, 1925), 73; D. Gauthier, The Logic of
Leviathan (Oxford, 1969); A. Ryan, ‘Hobbes’s Political Philosophy’, in: The Cambridge
Companion to Hobbes, ed. T. Sorell (Cambridge, 1996), 208–45, 237; D. van Mill,
Liberty, Rationality and Agency in Hobbes’s Leviathan (Albany, 2001); A. P. Martinich,
‘Hobbes’s Reply to Republicanism’, in: Nuove Prospecttive Critiche sul Leviatano di
Hobbes, ed. L. Foisneau, G. Wright (Milan, 2004), 227–39, at 228; R. Tuck, ‘Hobbes
and Democracy’, in: Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, ed. A.
Brett, J. Tully, with H. Hamilton-Bleakley (Cambridge, 2006), 171–90; L. Jaume,
‘Hobbes and the Philosophical Sources of Liberalism’, in: Cambridge Companion to
Hobbes’s Leviathan, 199–216.
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them its necessity – and so also the necessity of the condition that
sustained it, to which he gave the name ‘peace’.35 To this end, given
the way he understood them to be, people had to understand both
that it was they who made and sustained the order that sustained
them, but also that they could not unmake it nor vary it at will,
because not any ordering of life produced by the judgements of
individual wills would sustain it, or them. In other words, people
had to understand themselves at once as free and bound, as both
the makers and sustainers of authority and its subjects. If they did
this, peace would obtain; if not, it would not. And if not, whether
they recognised it or not, they would be at war with one another.
If the practical implication of this ambition was captured most
succinctly in the claim, made in the Review and Conclusion to
Leviathan, and picked up by Schmitt, that the book had ‘no other
designe, than to set beforemen’s eyes themutual relation between
Protection and Obedience’, which required the inviolable observa-
tion of the conditions that Hobbes had laid out, the ambition was
illustrated most memorably in the book’s justly famous frontis-
piece which shows the dual understanding he required – in it
people are represented as equal makers of sovereignty and equally
awestruck before it.36
This emphasis on equality is not accidental. For Hobbes was
clear that people could only be reconciled to the necessities of
peace once everyone understood himself to be subject to the same
terms:Without equal terms, as he said in De cive, there could be no
peace.37 This emphasis may seem glaringly at odds with Hobbes’s
account of sovereignty by acquisition, in which a gaping inequality
produces sovereignty. But Hobbes notoriously insists, as we have
noticed above, that the sovereignty is the same whether it is
acquired or instituted.Wemaywonder how this could be so. A clue
to the answer is to be found in the structure of Hobbes’s argument.
Hobbes’s argument is identical in its structure to the argument
made some time later by John Locke in which the absolute
dependence of human beings on God produces their freedom and
equality one to another. Locke argued that because human beings
belonged to God and were obliged to follow His directions and had
no right to surrender themselves completely to anyone else’s
directions, therefore they – and their actions – could not be owned
by another human being. In that sense they each owned
themselves (for no human being possessed by nature any claim
over them) and, in consequence of bearing duties to God which
required them to act in relation to Him and in relation to human
beings, themselves as well as others, they each had claims – or as
Locke sometimes preferred to put it, rights – that other human
beings could not gainsay.38 But whereas Locke applied the idea of
dependence to the relation between man and God, which in turn
established the rather different terms of the relations between
man and man, Hobbes applied it unmediated to the relations
between man and man.39 Hobbes’s account of sovereignty is
therefore the worldly application of a theological pattern, and the
result of that application is a politics that subsumes theology (and
in which obedience to the sovereign subsumes obedience
to God).40 The equality of all under the one God is transformed
in Hobbes’s account into the equality of all under the one
sovereign.41
With Hobbes, it is people’s continuing dependence on the
sovereign for protection that establishes their freedom and
equality one to another. Recently Philip Pettit has suggested that
Hobbes ignored the possibility that people might be content with
enjoying equality with others, and being recognised as equal,42 but
this suggestion rather misses his point. The point was that people
could only ever be content if they were all equally subject to the
one sovereign, which stood over and apart from them all. By
contrast, those who saw themselves as subject to no-one would
continually strive to dominate others – for ‘amongst masterless
men’, as Hobbes said, ‘there is perpetuall war’.43
The problem, as Hobbes saw it, was that people were naturally
prone to self-righteousness and self-assertion. They wished to give
free rein to their desires, but their desires, unless subordinated to a
higher set of requirements, were as limitless as the conﬂicts over
themeans of satisfying them that inevitably followed in their train.
In one direction this led Hobbes to rule out at one stroke the claims
to liberty in which they (self-righteously) cloaked this wish –
whether liberty as the absence of subjection or the liberty to follow
one’s conscience where it pointed – and to insist that the only
genuine liberty available to people was a liberty rooted in
subjection.44 It was ‘in the act of our Submission’, as he wrote,
that ‘consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty’.45 In another
direction it led him to emphasise the need for authority, and more
especially the need for authority to manifest in two distinct ways:
both as an overwhelming power to cow human self-righteousness
and self-assertion and as a guarantor of fair dealing between
subjects equal before its gaze – themortal God who is king over all
the children of pride and the common judge and arbitrator of their
disputes.
It is this that gives Hobbes’s argument its dual character. His
story is one in which authority must be understood in one way for
one reason, and also in another way for quite another reason, with
both understandings together functioning as co-operative con-
traries.46 To say that authority must be understood in these ways
draws attention to another characteristic of Hobbes’s story, namely
the character of his explanations. For his explanations are
predicated on the assumption that the truth or the fact of
something depends to a great extent on its being understood as
such: to understand something in one way may thus be to bring
35 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.xiii.62.
36 Hobbes, Leviathan, A Review, and Conclusion, 395–6. For thewider complexities
of Hobbes’s iconography, see Skinner, Republican Liberty, 182–98 andH. Bredekamp,
‘Thomas Hobbes’s Visual Strategies’, in: Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan,
29–60.
37 Compare Hobbes, De cive, i.2, 25, which refers to ‘the equal conditions without
which society is not possible’.
38 For more detailed discussion, see Stanton, ‘Authority and freedom’, 13–17.
39 See e.g. Hobbes, De cive, viii.5, 104: ‘a citizen has nothing which is properly his
own, against the will of the commonwealth, or of the holder of sovereign power; but
each citizen does have things that are his own against his fellow citizens’. This
structural similarity may be one reason why commentators have so often been
tempted to represent the two thinkers as arguing substantively along similar lines,
notwithstanding the fact that the Lockean God prohibits voluntary slavery on the
Hobbesian model. See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett
(Cambridge, 1988), II.iv.23, 302.
40 See Hobbes, Leviathan II.xxvi.149–50. For a discussion of this idea that is
illuminating and elusive in equal measure, see J. Mitchell, Not By Reason Alone
(Chicago, 1993), 46–72.
41 Compare J. Mitchell, ‘Hobbes and the Equality of All under the One’, Political
Theory 21 (1993), 78–100.
42 P. Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton,
2008), 96.
43 Hobbes, Leviathan II.xxi.110. The equality people have by nature, which is an
equality of vulnerability, produces difﬁdence which in turn yields to war. Artiﬁce is
needed to transform nature and to make people equal on terms that ﬁt them for life
in society. See De cive, i.2, 25.
44 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.xi.47. For a discussion that emphasises the polemical
aspects of Hobbes’s arguments, see Skinner, Republican Liberty, 79–81.
45 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxi.111. That is to say, submission to the sovereign is the
precondition of both – Hobbes is not, of course, claiming that freedom and
obligation are identical.
46 This dual character was noticed very early on, of course, but taken as a sign of
Hobbes’s duplicity and bad faith: ‘[Hobbes] setteth down his opinion just as Gipsies
tell fortunes, both waies, that if the one misse, the other may be sure to hit, that
when they are accused of falsehood by one, theymay appeale to another’, Bramhall,
catching of Leviathan, 565; and compare A. Ross, Leviathan drawn out with a hook
(London, 1653), 18–20. In the modern period, the tendency has been to detect
deliberate misdirection (the view associated with Leo Strauss) or else the masterly
deployment of an ironical style of argument (the view associated with Quentin
Skinner). A somewhat different view is developed throughout Parkin, Taming.
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into existence what is understood, just as to forfeit a different
understanding may be to prevent that which was so understood
from coming to be.47
Interlude: Hobbes and language
It is important to pause for a moment to notice the very
particular understanding of words and their use that this
assumption embodied. Words, for Hobbes, indicated positions
about things but revealed nothing about the ‘objective’ nature of
those things – they denoted without connoting. This was as true of
the words which signiﬁed groups of simple ideas united by nature,
like man, horse, or worm,48 as it was of words that did not have a
referent that existed in nature but only in consequence of human
artiﬁce. Hobbes’s view was that these words did not suggest any
speciﬁc ideational content to the understanding at all, but instead
produced images of past experience connected with these words
and coloured by the affections and aversions of those who heard or
read them.49 Examples of such words included virtue, vice, and
justice, besides (by parity of reason) authority, freedom, protec-
tion, obedience and sovereign.
The centrality of these terms to Hobbes’s discussions requires
no emphasis. The clear inference from his view of language was
that to use words was less to discuss ideas in the abstract than to
raise images which touched the likes and dislikes of the listener or
reader. To do this was not a purely speculative activity because the
effect would not be cognitive, but practical: not simply to develop
ideas, but to alter conduct. To understand something would be to
be moved by words to adopt a particular position about it and to
behave in the appropriate way towards it. Human behaviour, on
this view, is reaction to pictures in the head. It takes place in
relation to a representation, which is not quite the same for any
two individuals, of what they suppose to be – though not what is –
the reality of things. Words impose an order on these ideas and
images, like subtitles on a reel of ﬁlm, with the aim of imprinting a
lasting organisation on people’s conduct.
It need hardly be added that this view of words and their
effects on the understanding gave speakers and writers an
unusually powerful role. It was up to them to connect words like
‘authority’ or ‘freedom’ with arrangements of their choosing, for
these words did not imply only one set of conceptual contents
(indeed, they implied none at all in themselves).50 At the same
time, it placed great responsibility in their hands, for they had the
power to direct people to the proper ends – or to redirect them to
other ends again. This direction would be in some measure
didactic, since it would involve expounding deﬁnitions and
explanations designed to call certain images to mind. But not just
any whatever deﬁnitions would do – deﬁnitions could not be
arbitrarily stipulated and then organised into a self-consistent
series, because they would need to speak to previous experience
(including previous linguistic experience) if they were to cue
listeners and readers to politically and morally desirable goals
through the evocation of the pleasurable or painful images
necessary to push them towards those goals or away from what
threatened them.51 Hobbes’s explanations were designed to alter
conduct in precisely this way.52 His explanations of the covenant
which generates sovereignty and of the freedom of private
conscience must be understood in this light, so also his remarks
about protection and obedience.53 We should begin with the
covenant.
The illusion of Hobbesian individualism
According to Schmitt, Hobbes’s conception of the state involved
a covenant, and he construed this covenant in an entirely
individualistic manner, as emerging from the self-interested
rational calculations of individuals impelled by fear into a
consensus about the demands of their common security.54 But,
as we saw above, Hobbes cannot be suggesting that people literally
make a state by covenanting onewith another or one after another.
So what is he suggesting? The claim advanced in this essay is that
Hobbes’s suggestion is something like the following: it is in
thinking of their own situation as if it were one in which they had
bound themselves in these terms that a multitude of individuals is
changed into a real unity. In other words, it is in and by
understanding themselves as being represented by one sovereign
that many individuals become a single people, and a multitude
becomes a civil society.55 The state is nothing other than the
totality of conditions which fulﬁls the needs of these individuals in
protecting them against a common enemy and one another.56 It
exists only insofar as those conditions exist and, when they do
exist, it is in part because individuals understand themselves as ‘a
people’ that depends upon the protections it receives from the
state for its continuing existence and has no will of its own except
and only insofar as it is represented by the sovereign.57 So, as
paradoxical as it may seem, the state is generated not by
individuals contracting together and thereby bringing something
47 See on this point K. Hoekstra, ‘Disarming the Prophets: Thomas Hobbes and
Predictive Power’, in Nuove Prospettive, 97–153, 150.
48 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxxi.191: ‘naturall Reason . . . is . . . so farre from teaching
us anything of Gods nature, as [it] cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of
the smallest creature living’.
49 See T. Hobbes, Elements concerning Body, i.2.3-14, in: The English Works of
Thomas Hobbes, ed.W.Molesworth, 11 vols. (London, 1839–45), i, 15–24; Leviathan,
I.iv.17.
50 In his recent work, Quentin Skinner has annexed this feature of Hobbes’s
thinking to his repertoire of rhetorical techniques, while Kinch Hoekstra has
addressed its implications when considering Hobbes’s accounts of tyranny.
Compare Skinner, Republican Liberty, 209–10 and K. Hoekstra, ‘Tyrannus Rex vs.
Leviathan’, Paciﬁc Philosophical Quarterly, 82 (2001), 420–46.
51 See Leviathan, III.xxxii.195: ‘I have derived the Rights of Sovereigne Power, and
the duty of Subjects hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; such as
Experience has found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so’,
and compare Elements of Law, vi.3, 41.
52 It seems that, for Hobbes, the exercise of linguistic authority is always to some
extent an exercise in persuasion, whether it is conducted in a scientiﬁc mode or in a
rhetorical mode, for it is always an attempt to raise in the minds of others the
images sufﬁcient to produce the conduct desired. Sometimes this will be achieved
best by explaining the connections of complex words to those whose under-
standings are equipped to grasp those connections (perhaps because they have
some familiarity with the speciﬁed conceptual content of those words and of their
connections already), at other times by the use of imagery with which pleasure or
pain and danger are associated, at others again by the use of both together. Much
would depend on the experiences of those whom one wished to persuade, a point
which Hobbes acknowledged in his own practice when varying his mode of address
in his political writings according to his intended audience. This should not be read
as implying the primacy of rhetoric over philosophy: the gist of Hobbes’s ‘Answer’
to William Davenant’s ‘Preface’ to Gondibert is that philosophy ought to control
rhetoric not vice versa – that rhetoric may ornament but cannot displace truth. See
W. Davenant Gondibert, ed. D. F. Gladish (Oxford, 1971), 3–55. But the distinction
between modes is rather blurrier than might be expected.
53 See also the account of the state of nature, which invokes images of pain,
privation and peril in order to elicit the practical conclusions that a proper
understanding of sovereignty requires.
54 Schmitt, ‘State as Mechanism’, 97.
55 To avoid confusion, it is imperative to understand that the covenant is not
‘hypothetical’ in the sense in which that term is used in modern scholarship. The
problem is not what idealised individuals would covenant to in a hypothetical
condition of equality (the state of nature), but rather one of showing that the only
way sovereignty can be sustained is if real individuals all think of themselves as
having covenanted on these terms.
56 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xvii.86: ‘And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if
their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect . . . no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common
enemy, nor against the injuries of one another’.
57 This is why, unlike in Locke, in Hobbes the dissolution of the state involves the
dissolution of civil society.
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new into existence, but by their ceasing to think of themselves as
individuals at all, and acting accordingly.
If this account of generation sounds odd to modern ears, it may
be necessary to add that, for Hobbes, generationwas the process by
which something undergoes ‘a changewhichmakes us assign to, or
remove from [it] the name that answers the question: ‘‘What is the
thing?’’’. In other words, it was not strictly analogous with birth or
creation, even if Hobbes sometimes wrote as if to suggest that it
were.58 In any event, this is not ‘individualism’ on any ordinary
understanding, and certainly not individualism as Schmitt or his
critics understand it. It is rather an attempt to use the language of
individualism to propel people towards the ends which Hobbes
considered not only desirable but necessary if they were to live
together in security and peace.
A similar ﬁnding arises if we turn to the notion of inner freedom.
About this notion Schmitt’s contention was that by absorbing the
right of private freedom of thought into the political system,
Hobbes had outwitted himself. He had required only external
obedience, leaving it to the private reasoning of every individual to
decidewhetherwhatwas requiredwas true and good. This, though
seeming to suggest the necessity of obedience to the public
judgements of the supreme power, had turned out to be a
guarantee of individuality and so of disobedience.59
Hobbes’s point, however, was a temporary one – that men
retained in the civil condition of his day many of the uncivil
characteristics that had recently driven them to kill one another in
their tens of thousands. This required him to proceed with caution,
and to vary his means. Thus, even while he was suggesting a set of
formal requirements designed only to manage those character-
istics, his deeper aim was to determine what people thought and
thus to affect practical conduct in a profoundly anti-individualistic
way. Though it may be said to guarantee a wide range of other
rights, the ultimate realization of civilization as Hobbes envisaged
it had no place for the freedom to decide for oneself: it demanded
the complete submission of private judgement to the common
rules by which every man would live – the ‘publique Conscience,
by which he hath already undertaken to be guided’ in becoming a
member of the state.60 For ‘the Actions of men proceed from their
Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the
well-governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and
Concord’; if opinions were governed well-enough, as by the
broadest possible diffusion and institutionalisation of his own
principles, commonwealths might, ‘excepting by external violence
[be made] everlasting’.61 It was private difference, as opposed to
the state, that wouldwither away – and rightly so, since the former
was the prelude to the splintering of society; the latter, by contrast,
would stand unquestioned.
Protego ergo obligo
All these conceptions are embodied in Hobbes’s explanation of
the mutual relation between Protection and Obedience. At ﬁrst
blush, that explanation is a simple one: people are obliged to obey
whoever provides themwith protection, and the ability to provide
protection is what gives an authority the right to expect obedience.
A second look suggests that matters are not so simple after all. For
if protection requires obedience, it is also the case that those who
are protected must see themselves in that light, as protected
persons returning what is owed in exchange for a beneﬁt they
continue to receive. Thus it is important for them to imagine the
sovereign to be supremely powerful, in order to conceive it as
capable of providing protection (and so as a suitable object of
obedience). As Hobbes observed, this meant that the reputation of
power was itself power, since it ‘draweth with it the adhaerence of
those that need protection’.62 The reputation of power in turn
encouraged people to attribute the qualities of wisdom and
goodness to that same power in an honoriﬁc declaration of their
willingness to obey it in the hope of beneﬁt. Seeing the sovereign as
wise and good as well as powerful made it plausible to think that
these attributes would indeed be turned to the beneﬁt of those
subject to their possessor, and so that the beneﬁts should be
returned with obedience. Obedience would likely be widespread if
the sovereign’s power was feared, certainly, but also if it showed
these other attributes in distributing its beneﬁts equitably – and it
would increase its power by doing so, becoming better able to
protect people in the process; and so the cycle would begin again.
Once his doctrines were properly understood, as Hobbes said, the
truth of speculation would be converted into the utility of
practice.63
Hobbes’s theory therefore had about it something of the self-
fulﬁlling prophecy.64 His purpose was to frame men’s minds to
certain modes of conduct, to reconcile them to the necessity of the
state (and all that was required to sustain it) while revealing to
them the dangers ofmistaking their ownwants and preferences for
the ultimate arbiters of human conduct.65 Ultimately this required
every individual to come to see the world in the same way and
thereby to transform it collectively.66 So if by nature all men were
‘provided of notable multiplying glasses (that is their Passions and
Selfe-love)’ through which those necessities and dangers were
made to recede into the distance, it was necessary to replace these
glasses with ‘prospective glasses (namely, Morall and Civill
Science)’ through which they might ‘see a farre off the Miseries
that hang over them’ and which could not be avoided without the
total submission of all to the one sovereign.67
Concluding remarks
It was claimed near the beginning of this essay that Hobbes was
one of the thinkers withwhomwe are obliged to engage if wewish
to come to grips with the political condition of the world in which
we live. The essay has endeavoured to say something about the
relationship between Schmitt and Hobbes, and to explain, to its
author’s satisfaction if to no-one else’s, why, for all that it was
saturated with his own prejudices and subtended from his own
58 See T. Hobbes, Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, ed. H. Whitmore Jones
(Bradford, 1976), v.3, 58–9. But compare Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxix.167, for
procreation as a synonym for generation, and Q. Skinner, ‘Hobbes on Persons,
Authors and Representatives’, in: Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan, 157–
80, at 175.
59 Schmitt, State Theory, 56–57.
60 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxix.169. For a fuller account of the way Hobbes executed
his aims in this direction, see J. Parkin, ‘Hobbes and Self-Censorship’, forthcoming.
61 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xviii.91, II.xxx.176. Compare on this point E. Voegelin, The
New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952), 160.
62 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.x.41–5.
63 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxxi.194. Compare Behemoth, 59: ‘if men know not their
duty, what is there can force them to obey the laws? An army, youwill say. Butwhat
shall force the army?’.
64 See Hoekstra, ‘Disarming the Prophets’, 152, and compare L. Strauss, Natural
Right and History (Chicago, 1953), 200–1.
65 See Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xxix.169.
66 This understanding of Hobbes’s prepossessions and argumentative purposes
helps to explain why Leviathan is so full of the imagery of seeing and darkness.
Compare e.g. Leviathan, III.xxxix.248: ‘Temporall and Spirituall Government, are but
two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their
Lawfull Soveraign’, and IV.xliv.334: ‘Whence comes it, that in Christendome there
has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out of
their places, both by forraign, and Civill war? such stumbling at every little asperity
of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men? And such
diversity ofways of running to the samemark, Felicity, if it be not Night among us, or
at least a Mist? we are in the Dark’. For a small masterpiece of interpretation in this
vein, see M. Oakeshott, ‘Leviathan: A Myth’, in: Hobbes and Civil Association (Oxford,
1975), 150–4.
67 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.xviii.94.
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purposes, muchmore of Hobbes remains in Schmitt’s reading than
commentators have cared to concede. These explanations may be
sufﬁciently far from the received emphasis on Hobbes and Schmitt
to provoke further enquiry into matters upon which the essay has
been unable to enter. Above all, they point the need for a sustained
consideration of their respective conceptions of Christianity, the
roles attributed to it in securing cohesion and inspiring practical
conduct, and their attitudes to its rivals.68 But for the present it is
necessary to concludewith some brief remarks aboutwhat seem to
be the broader implications of the argument advanced here.
The ﬁrst remark is that what Hobbes shows very starkly, and
very persuasively, is that, absent the active and commanding
presence of a concerned Creator and an external and unimpeach-
able order of value against which the contingent preferences and
purposes of individual human beings or groups of human beings
are to be measured, no human value, good or right enjoys any
greater authority than the individuals or groups that make up a
society are inclined to assign to it.69 The second remark is that
human beings very quickly become accustomed to taking what
they happen to value for granted, and to thinking of those things as
embedded ﬁrmly in something concrete and real and lasting. Yet,
on the whole, they rarely pause to consider what Hobbes
considered very searchingly indeed, namely the means by which
those things, which are in themselves as intangible and as ﬂeeting
as thought itself, can be made to last. His conclusion was that in
some fundamental matters, and perhaps in most matters, civilized
collective action is impossible for long without a common
framework of thought and the threat of sanction from some
effectively external entity occupying the place vacated by the
absent and apparently unconcerned God.
The second aspect of this conclusion has received consider-
ably more attention from Hobbes scholars than the ﬁrst but the
ﬁrst is not less important. It is embodied in Hobbes’s notion of a
public doctrine, which is a framework of thought generated by
authority to guide action, in which direction is external to the
agent and comes from authority.70 This ‘publique Instruction,
both of Doctrine, and Example’,71 embraced both politics and
religion and had many of the features and contents of
Christianity, even if it did not speak for it in traditional terms.
Its purpose was to institutionalise and diffuse the unitary
framework of thought upon which effective collective action
inter alia depended, not least by persuading those who lived
together with one another to move towards consensus on
fundamental matters. This, as much as the looming presence in
their minds of the Leviathan state, was what sustained the
rights they held against one another and the freedoms that
they enjoyed to pursue their private satisfactions as they chose.
Neither one recommends itself very immediately or warmly
to the modern (liberal) mind. Yet each in its way performs a
function in respect of civilization that must be performed by
something, even today, and is being performed, more or less
effectively, by something, even today. Joseph Conrad once
wrote that ‘we live, as we dream, alone’; but this is false. We
live, as we dream, together; and we look to Hobbes and Schmitt
amongst others to help us to understand what sustains the
dream, and how we can avoid turning it into the worst of
nightmares.
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teach there, be a quiet waiting for the coming again of our blessed Saviour, and in
the mean time a resolution to obey the King’s laws (which are also God’s laws); to
injure noman, to be in charity with all men, to cherish the poor and sick, and to live
soberly and free from scandal, without mingling our religion with points of natural
philosophy, as freedomofwill, incorporeal substance, everlastings nows, ubiquities,
hypostases, which the people understand not, nor will ever care for’.
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